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CASE COMMENT
GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION:
THE EMERGING INTERMEDIATE STANDARD*
Craigv. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976)
An Oklahoma "non-intoxicating" alcoholic beverages statute, prohibited
the sale 2 of 3.2 percent beer to females under the age of eighteen and to
males under the age of twenty-one. Plaintiff, a licensed beer vendor, desiring
to sell beer to males eighteen- to twenty-years-old, was forced to choose between
statutory compliance accompanied by economic injury or statutory violation
and the resultant sanctions, including the possible loss of her vendor's
license. 3 Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of
the gender-based law by the defendant state officials, plaintiff claimed that
this age-sex differential violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 4 The three-judge district court upheld the statute and dismissed
the action, sustaining the constitutionality of the sex-based classification
because it was reasonably related to the state objective of promoting traffic
safety. 5 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and, HELD,
the sex-based classification was not "substantially related to achievement of
the statutory objective" and, accordingly, invidiously discriminated against
males, aged eighteen to twenty, in violation of the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution. 6
Adopted in 1868, the fourteenth amendment 7 has been the constitutional
*EDITOR'S

NOTE:

This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as

the outstanding case comment submitted in the Winter 1977 quarter.
1. 37 OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§241, 245 provide in pertinent part: "§241. It shall be unlawful for any person who holds a license to sell and dispense beer . . . to sell, barter
or give to any minor any beverage containing more than one-half of one percent of
alcohol measured by volume and not more than three and two-tenths (3.2) percent of
alcohol measured by weight. . . . §245. A 'minor,' for purposes of Sections 241 . . . is
defined as a female under the age of eighteen (18) years, and a male under the age
of twenty-one (21) years."
2. Only the sale and not the consumption of 3.2% beer is proscribed, leaving a vendor
as the obvious claimant. 97 S. Ct. 451, 456 (1976).
3. Thus satisfying the "injury in fact" standing requirement, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962), Carolyn Whitener was further granted third party standing to assert
the rights of males 18 to 20 years old. The claim of plaintiff Mark Walker, a male within
the statutorily proscribed age group, was mooted at the federal district court level because
he had reached the age of 21 before trial. Curtis Craig, a new party plaintiff, was
joined in the original suit but attained 21 before the United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction. 97 S. Ct. at 454.
4. Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Craig v.
Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
5. Id. at 1311.
6. 97 S. Ct. at 460.
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1: "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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provision most often associated with the securing of individual liberties. 8
Early decisions interpreting the equal protection clause of the amendment
restricted its application to cases involving racial discrimination.9 It was not
until 1971 that the Supreme Court found alleged sex discrimination violative
of equal protection. 0
Until recently the Court has applied a two-tiered approach to equal protection questions. The first tier employs the rational basis test- a minimum
scrutiny analysis that sanctions ,any legislative- classification as long as the
statutory distinction is rationally related to a conceivable state interest."'
Unless a legislative classification is patently arbitrary, the classification is
generally upheld."
Gender-based classifications have traditionally been subjected to minimal
scrutiny; 3 however, the circumscribed scope of the Court's inquiry under
this test compels deference to the legislatively propounded rationales for
sex-based distinctions and has resulted in the sustaining of virtually all of
the gender-based statutory classifications that the Supreme Court has considered.' 4 The original sex discrimination opinions are replete with
8. Litigants have also based equal protection claims on the fifth amendment. The
Supreme Court's "approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been
precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
9. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 67-73 (1873). See generally, Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. Rrv. 1, 60 (1955); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
10. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
11. "[The equal protection clause] is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their
laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26 (1961).
12. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973) (classification according benefits
to servicemen's dependents on demand but requiring servicewomen first to prove their
spouses' actual dependence was patently arbitrary). See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (law requiring uniformed state police officers to
retire at age fifty upheld under the rational basis standard); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955) (statute prohibiting fitting or applying lenses or other optical appliances
without prescription from a licensed optometrist or physician had a rational basis). A
classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
13. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (statute exempting all women from
jury service is constitutionally permissible) (qualified' by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975)); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 'U.S. 464 (1948) (Michigan statute permitting no
female bartenders other than wife or daughter of male owner of liquor establishment not
violative of equal protection; holding disapproved of in Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 463
n.23 (1976)); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (statute limiting women to 10-hour
work day in laundry has a rational basis); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.). 130, 141
(1873) (law declaring women ineligible to practice law violates no constitutional provision).
14. See, e.g., cases.cited note 13 supra. Sea'generally Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss3/7

2

Aikin: Gender-Based Discrimintion and Equal Protection: The Emerging Int
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

rationalizations that exhibit a high tolerance for sexual inequality. 15 Thus,
although the rational basis standard has sufficed for challenges against economic
and commercial regulation, many commentators have impugned its suitability
for social legislation, particularly in the area of sex discrimination.'6
The second tier of equal protection analysis is drawn into play when a
classification involves a fundamental right expressly or impliedly guaranteed
under the constitution 1 7 or is based on "suspect"'

8

criteria. When such condi-

tions are present, the Court invokes the more stringent judicial analysis of
the compelling state interest test, or strict scrutiny approach. Strict scrutiny
suspends the usual presumption of validity attached to legislative enactments1 9 and shifts the burden to the state to demonstrate a "compelling state
Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1499 (1971);
Comment, Equal Protection of the Laws: Sex is Not a Suspect Classification, 27 U. FLA. L.
REV. 288, 289 n.11 (1974).
15. "[A] state . . . [may] . . . conclude that a woman should be relieved from
the civic duty of jury services unless she herself determines that such service is consistent
with her own special responsibilities." Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961); "What can be
closer to the public interest than the health of women and their protection from unscrupulous
and overreaching employers?" West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 598 (1937);
"[H]er physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions -having
in
view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race -justify legislation to protect
her from the greed as well as the passion of man." Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422
(1908); "The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother." Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley,
J., concurring). See generally The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAtv. L. Rv. 43 (1974);
Note, "A Little Dearer Than His Horse": Stereotypes and the Feminine Personality, 6 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTS - Civ. Li$s. L. REV. 260 (1971).
16. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv.
1, 17-19 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1075
(1974). See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 104 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
17. The Supreme Court has, at one time or another, categorized the following interests
as "fundamental": (1) right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
(2) right to interstate travel, Memorial Hospital v, Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); but cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975)
(Iowa durational residency requirement for divorce not unconstitutional); (3) right to
procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); and (4) right to a criminal
appeal, Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356
(1963). See generally Goodpastor, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 Aa. L.
REV. 479 (1973); Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal
Protection, 40 U. CH. L. Riy. 802 (1973).
18. The elements of a "suspect" class are unsettled. Definitions articulated by the
Court have included "discrete and insular minorities," United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and "the class [that] is . . . saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process," San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973). See text accompanying note 49 infra.
19. "[A] state must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible
and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary . . . to the accomplish-
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interest.."20 Although various Justices have considered sex as suspect,2 ' only
race,22 alienage,23 and national origin 24 have been formally accorded .full
suspect status by the Supreme Court. 25 In fact, gender-based classifications
have been declared inherently suspect on only one occasion in a decision
rendered by a plurality of four Justices 26 who have since modified their
opinions. 27 Since the burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest
has been difficult to overcome, labeling a classification "suspect" has typically
28
signaled the demise of the legislation.
A third, middle tier of equal protection analysis has been emerging from
the opinions of the Burger Court. This intermediate level of scrutiny, reflected more clearly in some of the Justices' individual opinions, 29 has yet
ment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22
(1973) (footnotes omitted).
20. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969). The required state interest has also been termed "substantial," In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973); "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343
(1972); or "overriding," Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
21. See text accompanying notes 41-54 infra.
22. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 191-92 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
23. E.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971). But see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
24. E.g., Oyama v. California, 322 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-70 (1886).
25. Even though never formally acknowledged as inherently suspect, both illegitimacy,
e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631-32 (1974); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968); but see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971); and poverty, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 61 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); but see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), have on several occasions been considered as invalid
bases for statutory distinctions.
26. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See discussion of case in text
accompanying notes 43-49 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 51-78 infra.
28. See Comment, supra note 14, at 290. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (statute denying welfare benefits to aliens violates equal protection); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (statute making interracial cohabitation illegal violates equal
protection clause). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (conviction
of Japanese-American citizen for failure to comply with military exclusion order upheld
because of wartime conditions and military's apprehension of imminent public danger).
29. See Craig v. Boren, 97 S.Ct. 451, 463 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); 97 S. Ct.
at 466 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 97 S. Ct. at 467 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 542 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (exclusion of women from
jury duty unconstitutional); Geduldig v. Aiello 417 U.S. 484, 502 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (disability insurance for pregnancy-related work loss not compelled under
equal protection clause); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (state recoupment of legal
fees for indigent defendants violated equal protection clause); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972) (invalidated durational residency requirements for voting); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (upheld monetary ceiling
on Aid to Families with Dependent Children recipients).
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to be expressly acknowledged as a standard by the full Court. Better understood by examining recent sex discrimination cases,30 this inchoate analytical
scheme falls between the two traditional standards and requires that a state's
sex-based legislation relate in a persuasive manner to an articulated state
purpose 31 The middle tier approach does not accept at face value the legislative justifications for sex discrimination, as does the minimum scrutiny
standard, but neither does it demand the stringent compelling state interest
3 2
germane to strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court's digression from its usual rational basis treatment of
sex-based classifications was first evident in Reed v. Reed.33 The challenged
provision of the Idaho probate code gave preference to males over females
if two individuals were otherwise equally entitled to appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate.3 4 Acknowledging the similarity in qualifications of the two applicants, the probate judge deferred to this statutory directive and appointed the decedent's father.3 5 On appeal, the Supreme Court
initially framed the issue in minimum scrutiny terms36 with the vague statement that the classification was "subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. ' ' 37 Although the plurality opinion could be construed to have
applied the rational basis test, in actuality, the Court was far from deferential
to the stated legislative purpose of administrative convenience. Instead, the
unanimous Court rejected Idaho's proffered legislative rationale,38 and concluded that a statute mandating the choice of administrators solely on the
basis of sex created the kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
equal protection clause.3 30. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See generally Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup.
CT. REV. 157.
31. 97 S. Ct. at 457.
32. See Gunther, supra note 16; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975).
33. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See generally Note, The Reed Case: The Seed for Equal Protection from Sex-Based Discrimination or Polite Judicial Hedging? 5 AKRON L. REv. 251 (1972);
The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 118-19 (1972).
34. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72-73 (1971).
35. The father rather than the mother was appointed administrator since "[o]f
several persons claiming and equally entitled . . . to administer, males must be preferred
to females." Id. at 73 (quoting IDAHO COnE §15-314).
36. "The question presented by [Reed] . . . is whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to [the]
state objective .
" I.
Id. at 76.
37. Id. at 75.

38. Idaho contended that the statutory scheme reduced the workload on probate
courts by removing one class of contestants and that the legislation diminished intrafamily controversy. Id. at 76. The state also argued that "men [are] as a rule more conversant
with business affairs than . . . woman." Brief for Appellee at 12, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971). "[I]n general men are better qualified to act as an administrator than are
women." Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638
39. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
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Reexamining Reed one term later, Justice Brennan observed that the
Court implicitly denied what was an apparently rational explanation of the
statutory scheme. 40 In a stricter construction, Reed has been interpreted to
hold only that administrative convenience alone was not a sufficiently important legislative goal to justify a gender-based classification. 41 Although
the Court purposely sidestepped the issue of sex as a suspect class,4 2 the Reed
decision, nonetheless, heralded the emergence of a new sensitivity to sex-based
distinctions and introduced an intensified rational basis scrutiny to gender4
based discrimination. 3
Contrary to Reed, the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson44
openly confronted the issue of whether sex categorizations were suspect and
held that all classifications based upon sex were inherently suspect and
therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 45 Frontieroinvolved statutes which
provided a serviceman with dependents' benefits merely upon claiming his
wife as a dependent but denied similar benefits to a servicewoman unless she
proved that her husband was dependent upon her for over one-half of his
support.40 Sifting through the governmental interests supporting the different
treatment,47 the Court decided that the governmental interest in efficient
administration of programs was an insufficient justification for a legislated
distinction if the end result was a disparate treatment of male and female
service members. 48 The plurality opinion set forth three indicia of a suspect
40. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1972).
41. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (equitable career advancement, in
addition to administrative convenience, sufficient justification for statute permitting female
officers more time to qualify for advancement before mandatory retirement). The administrative convenience rationale was also advanced in other sex discrimination cases. See Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
42. Counsel for appellant in an elaborate brief had urged the Court to elevate genderbased classifications to "suspect" status. Brief for Appellant at 14-53, Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971). During the next term Justice Marshall criticized the Court's guarded
language, and characterized Reed as "drawn more as [an effort) to shield rather than to
reveal the true basis of the Court's decision." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 110 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. See Gunther, supra note 16, at 34-35. "We do feel it clear under Reed that the
ordinary presumptions favoring the validity of state statutes do not fully apply where a
sex-based classification is made." Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304, 1308 (W.D. Okla.
1975), rev'd sub nom. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
44. 411 U.S, 677 (1972).
45. Id. at 688. Eight Justices agreed that this sexual classification violated the equal
protection clause, but only four-Brennan, Marshall, White and Douglas-found that
sex was a suspect classification.
46. Id. at 677-79.
47. The government's arguments in favor of these statutes reinforced sexual inequality.
"[W]ives . . . frequently are dependant upon their husbands, while husbands rarely are
dependent upon their wives ....
[I]t would be both cheaper and easier simply conclusively
to presume that wives of male members are financially dependent upon their husbands, while
burdening female members with the task of establishing dependency in fact." Id. at 688-89.
48. Id. at 690-91. The strict scrutiny standard was mentioned by the plurality, but
whether the analysis was actually employed is debatable. "mhe Brennan opinion does
not mention the need-for [a compelling state interest] ....
An inference can be drawn
that he would have upheld the classification if it in fact advanced the government's
interest in economy." See. Nowak, supra note 16, at 1078.
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class: (1) that the class suffers from an immutable characteristic determined
solely by accident of birth, bearing no relation to ability to contribute in
society, (2) that the class suffers historic vilification, and (3) that the class
lacks effective political power and redress. 49 These factors, though seemingly
helpful, only lent greater confusion to the already muddled state of sex
discrimination analysis. 50
Because women have traditionally lacked political and economic power in
American society, the suspect class criteria advanced in Frontiero function
well when applied to gender-based classifications that discriminate against
women. 51 The indicia, however, are unsuited to an equal protection analysis
of classifications which discriminate against males. This unsuitability became
apparent in Kahn v. Shevin 2 in which a widower disputed the validity of a
Florida statute granting widows an annual .500 property tax exemption that
was denied to widowers.5 3 The members of the Frontiero plurality had
obviously not anticipated this legislative variation and, consequently, found
themselves in disagreement as to the applicability of the Frontiero criteria to
the Kahn situation.5 4 The majority, returning to the minimum scrutiny
model, found Florida's interest in benefiting widows a rational basis for the
statutory distinction and upheld the statute. 55
49. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685, 686 n.17 (1972). See generally Wilkinson,
supra note 32, at 980-81.
50. Schlesinger v. Ballard. 419 U.S. 498, 511 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
text accompanying notes 52-58 infra.
51. As explained by Justice Marshall, (I) femaleness is an immutable characteristic,
(2) the position of women in society at one time rivaled that of pre-Civil War slaves in
legal and voting matters, and (3) women have been under-represented in state and
federal government. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1972). See generally
Wilkinson, supra note 32, at 980-82.
52. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See Comment, supra note 14.
53. 416 U.S. at 351.
54. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in dissent, labeled all gender-based
categorizations suspect and further found that although the Florida objective of providing
special benefits for women was worthwhile, the state's goal could be better served by a
more narrowly drawn statute. Id. at 357-60. Justice White, dissenting, similarly found the
classification suspect, but desired a statutory scheme tailored to widow and widower
alike. Id. at 360-62. The fourth member of the Frontiero plurality, Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority in Kahn, apparently concluded that the suspectness of sex classifications
comprehended women but not men. Although Justice Douglas did not explicitly analyze
widowers in terms of the three criteria espoused in Frontiero, he did characterize the
American culture as "male-dominated," thus implicitly determining that maleness is an
immutable characteristic and that widowers as a class have suffered no historic discrimination or political powerlessness. Id. at 353-56.
55. Id. at 355. See Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court; 1971-1974,
49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 617, 670 (1974). The remedial nature of the Florida statute, FLA. STAT.
§196.202 (1973), may also have influenced the decision. The legislature had enacted the
preferential tax treatment to balance a history of economic discrimination against women.
Characterized as "benign" discrimination, this subtle reinforcement of sexual role typing,
camouflaged as a favor to women, apparently eluded the majority and possibly contributed
to the holding.
"[Elven clear 'favors' are part of a pattern of legal and social double standards which,
in defining sexual roles, limit a woman's opportunities for individual fulfillment." The
Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV, 43, 138 (1974). "Although the [Kahn] tax
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As Frontiero and Kahn epitomize opposite results in judicial treatment
of sex-based classification, so Stanton v. Stanton56 appears to mark a gradual
centering between the deferential rational basis test and the interventionist
compelling state interest test. In Stanton, the constitutionality of a statute which
specified twenty-one as the age of majority for males and eighteen as the age
of majority for females was challenged. 57 The Stanton age-sex differential
was evaluated in the context of a divorced husband's obligation to make
support payments until his child reached the age of majority. 58 In seeking
continued support for her daughter until age twenty-one, the wife contended,
and the Court agreed, that such sexual discrimination violated the equal
protection clause.Po
Relying on Reed, the Stanton majority undercut Frontierowith the statement, "We find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether a classification
based on sex is inherently suspect." 60 Yet no new explicit equal protection
test for gender-based classifications was advanced. The majority opinion left
the lower courts to grapple with the statement that "under any test-compelling
state interest, or rational basis, or something in between" the challenged statute
61
will not survive an equal protection attack.
The abstruseness of equal protection analysis, 6 2 augmented by the indefiniteness of the emerging intermediate standard, laid the predicate for the
instant case. In overturning the Oklahoma sex-based statute, the Court employed neither the rational basis nor the compelling state interest test. The
majority set forth a new standard, stating that "classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
exemption standing alone might be of minimal influence on a husband and wife in their
respective choices of economic roles, cumulation of such legal 'favors' could have the
effect of reinforcing the desirability of the man working and the woman staying at home."
Id. at 138 n.58.
56. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 17.
60. Id. at 13. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 653 n.2 (1974).
61. 421 U.S. at 17.
62. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), graphically highlights the disordered state of sex discrimination analysis. The challenged G.E. disability plan provided
nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits to all its employees but excluded disabilities
arising from pregnancy. Construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. §2000(e) (1970), to sanction a disability plan that fails to cover pregnancy related
disabilities, and relying on Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Court sustained
the plan and concluded that a "gender-based discrimination had not been shown to
exist." 97 S. Ct. at 408. "There is no evidence in the record that the selection of the
risks insured by the program worked to discriminate against any definable group or class
in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the program. There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there
is no risk from which women are protected and men are not." Id. (quoting Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)). See Wilkinson, supra note 32, at 978 (Geduldig
illustrates the Supreme Court's reluctance to make sex discrimination fully suspect.). See
also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave
provisions held violative of the fourteenth amendment).
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to achievement of those objectives."63 Moreover, to withstand an equal protection challenge, a gender-based distinction must "closely serve" the achievement of the state's alleged legislative interest. 4 Citing Reed as controlling, the
plurality quoted the amorphous phrase that sex discriminations are "subject
to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause' ' 6 and consequently required
a showing that sex represented a legitimate, accurate basis for the regulation
of drinking and driving.66
Four concurring opinions were filed two of which directly confronted
the question of the appropriate standard for equal protection analysis.6 7
Although the plurality merely alluded to a third review standard, Justice
Powell openly acknowledged that the Court now subjects gender-based discriminations to a more critical examination than is normally applied under
the usual rational basis standard.68 Admitting that the Court has had difficulty
agreeing on a consistent standard of equal protection analysis suitable to the
wide variety of legislative classifications, Justice Powell recognized the "middle
tier" approach but, nonetheless, was unable to subscribe to it.69 Favoring the
traditional rational basis standard, he focused on the means adopted to
achieve the legislative ends and found that the 3.2 percent beer statute
could be so easily evaded as to be essentially meaningless.7 0
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens acknowledged the critics of
the multi-tier approach but argued that the two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims was only "a method the Court has employed to explain
decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent
fashion."71 He postulated that a careful explanation of reasons motivating
particular decisions would do more to identify that standard than past attempts
to represent the standards' elements in all-encompassing terms. 72 He, therefore, adopted none of the articulated standards but explained that he joined
the plurality because the legislative distinction was predicated on an accident
of birth and was grossly overinclusive. 7s
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

97 S. Ct. at 457.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 457 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)).
Id. at 460.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, unpersuaded by Oklahoma's statistical

data, concluded that the disparate statutory treatment was totally irrational, lacked any

supportable justification, and amounted to invidious discrimination. He cited Reed but
did not specify the review standard he had used to invalidate the legislation. Id. at 466.
Justice Blackmun's brief opinion was confined to the sub-issue of the interaction of the
twenty-first amendment with the Oklahoma statute. Id.

68. "[Clandor compels the recognition that the relatively deferential 'rational basis'
standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based
classification." Id. at 464.
69. Id.
70.

Justice Powell was probably referring to the plurality's statement that the statute

does not prohibit the drinking of the beverage once acquired, "even after purchase by
their 18-20-year-old female companions." Id. at 460.
71. 97 S. Ct. at 464 (Stevens, J., concurring).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 464-65.
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• Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, believed the Court's analysis would conpound existing confusion and read the plurality opinion as making gender
a disfavored classification.74 Maintaining a firm rational basis approach, he
emphasized that in the absence of a clear showing of irrationality, the Court
should not have questioned the means employed to effect an allegedly valid
governmental interest regardless of the fact that the statute was unwise, un5
needed, or foolish.7
In a vehement dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for
creating an elevated or intermediate level of scrutinyr especially in view of
the past difficulty the Court had had with two review standards. Justice Rehnquist felt that the new approach invited subjective judicial preferences or
prejudices relating to certain types of legislation without solving any of the
past difficulties of equal protection analysis.77 He counselled a return to the
two-tiered system since the interest impaired -the right to buy 3.2 percent
beer-was not an important personal interest protected by the Constitution.78
Despite the four separate concurring opinions, the instant case may mark
the emergence from a badly divided Court of a consistent and coherent
standard to be applied in sex discrimination cases. When sex-based classifications are reviewed in the future, state legislative rationales are unlikely to be
accepted solely on the basis of rationality. The Court has suggested that it
will validate a sex-based statutory discrimination only if the means employed
7 9
bear a factually demonstrable relationship to an important state interest.
The rational basis standard, deferring to nearly any plausible state interest,
thus appears to have been supplanted by an intermediate level of scrutiny.8s
Although not specifically overruling Frontiero, the instant case signals a
withdrawal from the treatment of sex as inherently suspect. Apparently
dissatisfied with the use of "suspect" terminology in the sex discrimination
area, 1 the Court appears to agree with Chief Justice Burger's proposition that
the phrase "suspect classification" has, in actuality, tended "to stop analysis
while appearing to suggest an analytical process." 2 The adoption of the intermediate approach not only heightens sensitivity to sex discrimination but also
74. Id. at 467 (Burger; C.J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 468 (RAehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. "How is this Court to divine what objectives are important? How is it to determine
whether a particular law is 'substantially' related to the achievement of such objective,
rather than related in some other way to its achievement? Both of the phrases used are ...
diaphanous and elastic." Id. at 469.

78. Id.
79. It is interesting to note that Gunther has been urging the Court to adopt a meansscrutiny model since 1972. See Gunther, supra note 16.
80. Under the usual rational basis standard, the state rationale of enhancing traffic
safety would have been uncritically accepted as sufficient grounds for affirmation. Instead,
the Court engaged in an extended inquiry into the authenticity of the alleged correlation
between 3.2 beer sales and driving while under the influence of alcohol, concluding that the
statistics were ultimately unpersuasive. 97 S. Ct. at 458-60.
81. Nowhere in the opinion is the term "suspect" used.
82. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 730 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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eliminates the artificiality engendered by the demanding threshold requirements83 of strict scrutiny analysis.
While expressly acknowledging the precedential value of Reed, the Court
has gone one step further by shaping a more workable sex discrimination
standard. The criteria of "important" and "substantial"8' 4 will require subjective interpretation; nevertheless, these new tests should provide clearer
guidance for the lower courts than the vague "subject to scrutiny" test of
Reed.85 Although not a radical change in emphasis, the emerging middle tier
standard will likely have widespread implications on federal and state legislative decision-making by spurring lawmakers to be more attentive to the
rationales behind and the means selected for the implementation of genderbased classifications.
Chief Justice Burger's concern for the unavoidable confusion which
would stem from the principal case is unfounded. 86 When Frontiero was
decided the Court was urged not to intrude too deeply into the arena of sex
discrimination until resolution of the controversy over the states' ratification
of the equal rights amendment.8 7 Given the difficulty lower federal and state
courts have had in abstracting any consistent sex discrimination approach
from the Court's past reasoning8 8 and the uncertain future status of the equal
rights amendment, this conservatism and reticence is misplaced. Commentators have urged the formal adoption of an expanded reasonable means
analysis, invoking a stricter rationality standard to insure a more genuine
judicial inquiry.8 9 The analytical framework of the instant case closely parallels
this appealing model while also satisfying the constitutional mandate to the
Court to develop methods to uphold the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court should release any vestigial hold it retains on the
two-tiered system because that traditional mold obfuscates rational decision
making. Instead the Court should concentrate on sharpening the analytic
components of the emerging intermediate standard. A flexible approach,
allowing for a full analysis of the nature of the right asserted and the means
used to achieve the legislative aims, is imperative. Although sex discrimination may not be as inherently repugnant as race discrimination, it is directly
related to fundamental personal liberties and deserves a more careful judicial
scrutiny than has been traditionally afforded under the minimal scrutiny test.
83. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
84. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
85. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
86. See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
87. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1972) (Powell, J., joined by Burger,
C.J., and Blackmun, J., concurring). See generally Note, supra note 14; Ginsburg, Let's
Have E.R.A. as a Signal, 63 A.B.A.J. 70, 72 (1977).
88. See, e.g., Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304 (W.D. Okla. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala.
1972), rev'd sub non. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1972); Shevin v. Kahn, 273
So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1973), afJ'd, 416 U.S. 351 (1976).
89. See Gunther, supra note 16; Nowak, supra note 16; Wilkinson, supra note 32. See
generally San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 110 (1972) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (would employ a "sliding scale" approach to equal protection claims).
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The emerging intermediate standard, therefore, is logically and functionally
appropriate to the analysis of sex classifications and should be more fully
developed and refined.
Wm
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